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Vogelgrippe H5N1 - Behandlung oder Prophylaxe ?

Verfasst: Do 12. Jun 2008, 19:10
von Birgitt
AVIAN INFLUENZA, HUMAN (52): TREATMENT OR PROPHYLAXIS
*****************************************************
A ProMED-mail post
<http://www.promedmail.org>
ProMED-mail is a program of the
International Society for Infectious Diseases
<http://www.isid.org>

Date: Tue 10 Jun 2008
Source: HSToday online [abbreviated and edited]
<http://hstoday.us/content/view/3741/150>


The US government's new proposal to use drugs like Tamiflu and Relenza
[oseltamivir and zanamivir; neuraminidase inhibitors] as a prophylaxis to
prevent infection by a pandemic strain of influenza is wrongheaded, says Dr
Graeme Laver, a former professor of biochemistry and molecular biology in
the John Curtin School of Medical Research at the Australian National
University in Canberra. Laver told HSToday.us that "prophylaxis with
Tamiflu in a pandemic is wrong. Early treatment is the only way to go."

But the US government proposes to use Tamiflu and Relenza prophylactically
to prevent infection, including giving guidelines to businesses that may
want to buy the drugs in advance to treat or protect employees. The
Department of Health and Human Services' (HSS) pandemic plan calls for
"targeted antiviral prophylaxis ... of disease clusters, administration of
antiviral treatment to persons with confirmed or suspected cases of
pandemic influenza, and provision of drug prophylaxis to all persons in
[an] affected community."

Similarly, should clusters of humans be found infected with a virulent
strain of influenza like H5N1, the World Health Organization's plan of
attack is to flood the regions with Tamiflu in the hope that it will quell
further spread of the virus. Dr. Ben Schwartz, a pandemic planner at HHS
who wrote most of the new guidelines, told Reuters that "for prophylaxis of
health care and emergency services workers, the responsibility for
purchasing and stockpiling the drugs would primarily be on the health care
organizations ... or on the emergency organizations that would be
protecting their workforce."

Meanwhile, HSToday has learned that there also are discussions within HHS
about making Tamiflu and Relenza "push packets" available to people to have
on hand in the event of a pandemic. Laver also has problems with that
notion. "Personal stockpiles of Tamiflu or Relenza are not a good idea,"
Laver told HSToday, explaining, "personal stockpiles are wrong for 2
reasons. First, nothing might happen, and the stockpiles will be wasted,
and, 2nd, if the stockpiles are used, it will be on the basis of
self-diagnosis, and that is not a great idea."

"Widespread prophylaxis to control a pandemic before any vaccine is
available, is totally wrong," Laver continued. "It would be a wicked waste
of a valuable resource! Australia had a policy (long since abandoned) to
provide essential workers with Tamiflu prophylaxis for 6 weeks at the start
of the pandemic." But "what happens then?" Laver mussed. "Apart from the
difficulty in identifying the essential workers and keeping the Tamiflu
stockpile safe from desperate people who would do anything to get the drug,
at the end of 6 weeks, all those people who had been taking Tamiflu for
prophylaxis would be left without protection. And the stockpile would have
vanished."

Laver explained to HSToday that it is "much better to use Tamiflu only for
early treatment. If people with flu symptoms take Tamiflu immediately, say
within 6 or so hours after symptom onset, the infection should be rapidly
terminated, the person should recover, and then, and this is important,
should then be immune to reinfection for the rest of the pandemic. Much
better than any vaccine. This has been called 'Aborted-infection
Immunization,' and to use Tamiflu in this way would allow many health care
workers and so on to go about their business without fear of reinfection."

"People will, of course, say, 'but aborted-infection immunization has never
been shown to work,'" Laver said. "Of course not, but then neither has
long-term prophylaxis or the use of pre-pandemic vaccines. But my bet is
that it will!" To work, Tamiflu must be taken in proper doses within 6 to
12 hours after onset of symptoms. "48 hours is about the limit the drug is
effective," Laver said. Laver does believe that "prophylaxis with Tamiflu
should be used in some circumstances. For example, Tamiflu should be taken
by poultry workers culling H5 or H7 infected chickens," he said.

Prior to HHS's release of its new proposals Laver expressed his concerns in
a letter to Dr Bruce Gellin, director of the department's National Vaccine
Program Office and chairman of HHS secretary Michael Leavitt's Task Force
on Influenza Preparedness. "I believe this is completely wrong," Laver
wrote Gellin, explaining that "as soon as prophylaxis is stopped, the
person taking Tamiflu is just as susceptible to infection as before. Early
treatment would be so much better." Laver told Gellin: "Tamiflu should be
available over-the-counter [OTC] in pharmacies now, where flu victims can
get it without the time-wasting need to 1st get a prescription from a
doctor. There is no need for a prescription, and the time taken to get one
can render Tamiflu pretty well useless. "To have people familiar with the
correct use of Tamiflu (and Relenza) for seasonal influenza infections
would mean the community would be 'trained' in the correct use of these
drugs in the event of a pandemic. I imagine that, in this case, there would
be much less panic than would occur otherwise."

Laver told HSToday that it would be "much better to hold stocks of the
drugs in every pharmacy in the country where it can be got quickly after
diagnosis by a trained pharmacist or other health care worker." Laver also
said "using a rapid flu test to assist this would be a good idea, so that
people who think they have the flu can be properly diagnosed quickly and
take the drugs very soon after symptom onset. This rapid procedure of 'test
and treat' would mean that the infection should be immediately terminated
and the flu victim experience a quick recovery, seems quite simple, really!"

In late 2006, the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention awarded USD
11.4 million in contracts to 4 companies working to develop new diagnostic
tests that doctors and field epidemiologists could eventually use to
quickly and accurately test patients for avian influenza H5N1 and other
emerging influenza viruses, as well as more common [seasonal] influenza
viruses.

Brit Oiulfstad, pandemic influenza coordinator for the County of Los
Angeles, had earlier expressed concern to HSToday about the prophylactic
use of Tamiflu. Oiulfstad said she and other authorities "are concerned
about ... the current push for community-wide antiviral prophylaxis when
the effectiveness for such long-term use (several times the duration of the
recommended treatment period) has not been evaluated." Continuing,
Oiulfstad told HSToday that "planning for antivirals is very complex, as we
are not certain that the current antivirals will be effective in whatever
viral strain will be circulating. However, planning for any pharmaceutical
dispersal is good for other future events.

The Infectious Diseases Society of America (IDSA) said in an October 2005
statement that "personal stockpiling would likely lead to inappropriate use
and wastage," adding, "institutions should not stockpile drug for
prophylaxis of health care workers, as this strategy requires much greater
drug supplies than early treatment, and could deplete the reserve necessary
for treatment on a national level." IDSA and the Society for Healthcare
Epidemiology of America (SHEA) said local health care institutions ought to
have sufficient stockpiles to treat sick people and maintain the health
care system in the event of a pandemic. The group advised health care
facilities to have enough supply of the drugs to reduce hospitalizations
and mortality and maintain social order and function in the event of a
severe pandemic. "Hospitals will need to be able to treat those who are
sick and keep their own doors open," said Dr Kathleen Neuzil, chair of
IDSA's Pandemic Influenza Task Force. IDSA and SHEA do not recommend
institutions stockpile enough drugs to prevent illness among health care
workers because this strategy requires much greater drug supplies than
early treatment and could deplete the reserve necessary for treatment on a
national level.

HHS' goal is to have 81 million doses (10 capsules per dose) of Tamiflu,
Relenza, and Rimantidine available for the US population. Of this 81
million, 50 million are to be stored in the Strategic National Stockpile
(SNS). Of this, about 44 million courses are to be held for emergency
pandemic usage by states and 6 million reserved for domestic containment
efforts at the onset of localized outbreaks. Of the 50 million doses the
government plans to put into the SNS, though, HHS says only 37.4 million
have been procured and 29.8 million treatment courses put into the SNS, and
the remaining 7.6 million treatment courses are due by the end of calendar
year 2007. The balance, HHS says, is expected this year [2008].

The Department of Defense has stockpiled many millions less, and less than
half the states have stockpiled only 13 million of the 31 million doses HHS
is supposed to help states buy, largely because the remaining states have
had difficulty coming up with their share of the money for purchases.

There's another problem with Tamiflu. It has a shelf life of about 5 years,
which means stockpiles must be replenished. Existing mass stockpiles will
have to be replaced in order to ensure there are adequate stores beyond
2010, but according to F Hoffmann-La Roche, new orders for future batches
have dwindled, and there's a lag time in making the drug. The company has,
though, entered into agreements with other countries to allow them to
manufacture Tamiflu themselves.

The Food and Drug Administration manages a Shelf Life Extension Program,
but only products in the federal SNS are eligible to receive an extended
expiration date if a drug meets specific conditions. When states'
stockpiles expire, they will have to buy new supplies without additional
federal assistance. This problem, combined with those states that have yet
to procure their own stockpiles, means there could be a widespread national
shortage of antivirals. Thus, as Laver pointed out, using Tamiflu to treat
rather than trying to prevent infections is necessary to prevent the
valuable stockpiles of these drugs from being wasted.

[byline: Anthony L Kimery]

--
communicated by:
ProMED-mail rapporteur Mary Marshall

[Tamiflu (oseltamivir) and Relenza (zanamivir) are viral neuraminidase
inhibitors that can be used in the treatment of both Influenza A and B
virus infections. These anti-viral agents act as transition-state analogue
inhibitors of the influenza virus neuraminidase, preventing progeny virions
from emerging from infected cells. Tamiflu was the 1st orally active
neuraminidase inhibitor commercially developed. It is a prodrug, which is
hydrolysed in the liver to the active metabolite.

The preceding article argues for restriction of the use of Tamiflu to
treatment of influenza rather than for prophylaxis that currently appears
to be the preferred strategy in pandemic planning. However, the logic of
Graeme Laver's argument for restriction of the use of Tamiflu until
symptoms develop in order to achieve "aborted-infection immunization" is
compelling. - Mod.CP]

Re: Vogelgrippe H5N1 - Behandlung oder Prophylaxe ?

Verfasst: Do 12. Jun 2008, 21:10
von Birgitt
Dazu in dem Zusammenhang hier noch ein bereits etwas älterer Artikel:

Erstmals Vermarktung von Vogelgrippe-Impfstoff in der EU
Pharmakonzern GlaxoSmithKline erhält Genehmigung der EU-Kommission

19.05.2008

GlaxoSmithKline (GSK) darf als erstes Pharmaunternehmen einen Impfstoff gegen Vogelgrippe in der Europäischen Union vermarkten. Er soll eine Ansteckung mit Erregern des für Menschen lebensbedrohlichen Vogelgrippe-Typs H5N1 verhindern, bevor sich eine Pandemie ausbreiten ... mehr

Gruß
Birgitt

Re: Vogelgrippe H5N1 - Behandlung oder Prophylaxe ?

Verfasst: Mo 16. Jun 2008, 21:59
von Birgitt
AVIAN INFLUENZA, HUMAN (53): TREATMENT OR PROPHYLAXIS
*****************************************************
A ProMED-mail post
<http://www.promedmail.org>
ProMED-mail is a program of the
International Society for Infectious Diseases
<http://www.isid.org>

Date: Sun 15 Jun 2008
Source: Julian W Tang <ulian.tang@cuhk.edu.hk>


[The following comment has been received from Professor Tang in response to
the ProMED-mail post entitled "Avian influenza, human (52): treatment or
prophylaxis 20080611.1846". ProMED-mail welcomes this contribution, but as
debate is likely to divert attention from our principal function of
outbreak reporting, further discussion of this topic will be discouraged. -
Mod.CP]

Although the aborted-infection immunization approach may work, and is
preferable to mass prophylaxis, the main problem may be the implementation
of influenza rapid testing at pharmacists or other general practitioner
clinics, both of whom are untrained to perform such rapid tests. In
addition, they are usually already very busy and will be only more so
during any pandemic influenza event, so substantial resources will have to
be put into place to enable them to perform such rapid diagnostic testing
prior to the distribution of anti-influenza drugs, like oseltamivir.

In addition, most rapid tests for influenza require a minimum level of
training to perform well and may have quite a high rate of false negatives,
especially when the actual pandemic influenza strain will not have been
tested on existing kits (see CDC website for an up-to-date summary:
<http://www.cdc.gov/flu/professionals/diagnosis/>).

There needs to be some sort of mechanism for these samples to be forwarded
on to the local diagnostic or reference virology laboratory for viral
culture and further strain characterization, since none of these rapid
tests can distinguish influenza subtypes (i.e. H3N2, H5N1 and H1N1), but
just between influenza types A and B.

Secondly, if such a policy becomes widely accepted and publicized, a large
number of people with influenza-like illness will be swamping such premises
that probably do not have sufficient waiting area capacity to accommodate
all these patients whilst they are (presumably) registering their personal
details, awaiting their turn to have their nasal swab, etc. taken, then
waiting for the rapid test to be performed, then waiting for their results
(up to 30 minutes), then waiting for their oseltamivir.

Thirdly, there are also serious infection control issues to consider. While
all of these people are waiting with their influenza-like illness, they
will be coughing, sneezing, talking, mouth-breathing amongst themselves,
and may well be cross-infecting each other as well as any other patients or
staff members nearby; some of them may have TB (or perhaps even MDR-TB)
rather than a respiratory viral infection. Ideally, they should be made to
wear masks while they are in the waiting areas, but compliance with this
may be difficult to monitor and enforce. Importantly, there needs to be
some mechanism for referring the seriously ill directly to the local
Accident and Emergency room.

Fourthly, will these individuals have to pay for these tests and any
oseltamivir prescription? If so, what are the pharmacists and general
practitioners going to say to those people with an influenza negative test?
"Sorry, you may have another respiratory viral infection, but it is not
influenza, so please pay for your negative test result, then maybe you can
take some paracetamol and go home?"

Clinical microbiologists/virologists are usually wary of introducing such
rapid/bedside/near-patient/point-of-care diagnostic tests in healthcare
settings (usually to be performed by infectious disease or pediatric teams)
because of the need to then confirm such results (either positive or
negative) by the standard laboratory tests (again, see:
<http://www.cdc.gov/flu/professionals/diagnosis/>), since these results
will have a significant impact on subsequent clinical management (Madeley
2007). So the use of such rapid tests in community settings where the staff
are generally untrained with relatively non-specialized facilities needs to
be approached with caution.

The expenditure to put such community rapid testing facilities in place may
well outweigh the cost of the mass stockpiling and distribution of
antiviral drugs in preparation for any influenza pandemic. Of course, this
consideration should be secondary to the potentially worse alternative
scenario arising from the use of widespread prophylaxis that may result in
the widespread development of antiviral resistance, making such antivirals
useless.

References
----------
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) website. Clinical
Description & Lab Diagnosis of Influenza. Accessed 15 Jun 2008 at:
<http://www.cdc.gov/flu/professionals/diagnosis/>.
Madeley CR. Are point-of-care (POC) virological tests what is needed? Clin
Microbiol Infect 2007; 13(7): 655-6.

--
communicated by:
Julian W Tang, PhD, MRCP, FRCPath
Department of Microbiology
The Chinese University of Hong Kong
Prince of Wales Hospital
Shatin, New Territories
Hong Kong SAR
<ulian.tang@cuhk.edu.hk>

Re: Vogelgrippe H5N1 - Behandlung oder Prophylaxe ?

Verfasst: Do 19. Feb 2009, 13:31
von Birgitt
Warnung vor Pandemie
WHO weist auf Gefahr einer weltweiten Epidemie durch die Vogelgrippe hin

18.02.2009 - Deutschlandfunk

Medizin. - Das Vogelgrippevirus sei in Chinas Geflügelpopulation, der größten weltweit, "fest verwurzelt" und stelle unverändert eine Bedrohung dar, warnte die Weltgesundheitsorganisation WHO heute in Peking. Das Virus, so die WHO, habe das Potenzial zu einer Pandemie. Udo Buchholz vom Robert-Koch-Institut erläutert den Stand im Gespräch mit Uli Blumenthal ... mehr

Gruß
Birgitt

Re: Vogelgrippe H5N1 - Behandlung oder Prophylaxe ?

Verfasst: So 17. Mai 2009, 13:33
von Birgitt
SCHLECHTE AUSBREITUNG
Kalte Nasen lassen Vogelgrippe-Viren frieren

16.05.2009 - Spiegel

Empfindliche Viren: Experten sehen in der Vogelgrippe eine Pandemie-Gefahr. Glücklicherweise befallen die Erreger Menschen nur selten. Wissenschaftler haben nun auch den Grund dafür herausgefunden: Den Vogelgrippe-Viren ist es in der menschlichen Nase einfach zu kalt ... mehr

Gruß
Birgitt

Re: Vogelgrippe H5N1 - Behandlung oder Prophylaxe ?

Verfasst: Di 9. Jun 2009, 22:54
von Birgitt
AVIAN INFLUENZA (44): VACCINE, TRANSMISSION
*******************************************
A ProMED-mail post
<http://www.promedmail.org>
ProMED-mail is a program of the
International Society for Infectious Diseases
<http://www.isid.org>

In this update:
[1] New vaccine
[2] Transmission model


******
[1] New vaccine
Date: Mon 8 Jun 2009
Source: The Poultry Site [edited]
<http://www.thepoultrysite.com/poultryne ... -available>


A new H5N1 recombinant vaccine virus has been developed by the WHO
Collaborating Center for the Surveillance, Epidemiology and Control
of Influenza at the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (WHO
CC), Atlanta, USA from A/Egypt/2321-NAMRU3/2007 (H5N1; Clade 2.2.1),
thanks to the Ministry of Health & Population of Egypt for providing
the virus specimens.

This recombinant vaccine virus is available for distribution, under a
Material Transfer Agreement (MTA).

As with all seasonal and A (H5N1) influenza viruses, WHO has selected
and used for vaccine development, the sequences of the haemagglutinin
(HA) and neuraminidase (NA) of A/Egypt/2321-NAMRU3/2007, can be found
on the public web site of GenBank:
HA Sequence and NA Sequence [are available in the original article at
the URL above].

Institutions, companies, and others interested in pandemic vaccine
development, who wish to receive these candidate vaccine viruses
should contact either the WHO Global Influenza Programme
(<GISN@who.int>) or the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention,
at the address below:
WHO Collaborating Center for the Surveillance, Epidemiology and
Control of Influenza,
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention
Influenza Division, NCIRD, CCID
1600 Clifton Rd, MS G-16, Atlanta, GA 30333, USA
Fax: (404) 639-2350
<rvd6@cdc.gov> (Attention: Dr Ruben Donis)

Studies on the antigenic properties of A (H5N1) vaccine viruses and
their relation to the emerging H5N1 viruses are ongoing in the WHO
Global Influenza Surveillance Network.

The Global Influenza Program has been closely monitoring the
antigenic and genetic evolution of the circulating viruses,
especially human virus isolates. Countries are encouraged to share
with WHO their specimens and/or isolates, both from humans and
animals, for their inclusion in the WHO H5N1 vaccine virus
development and selection process, in addition to other activities of
public health significance.

--
Communicated by:
ProMED-mail Rapporteur Mary Marshall

[This report illustrates the need to share viral isolates and
maintain an international repository. One hopes that other countries
will share their isolates, and benefit from the development of new
vaccines. - Mod.TY]

******
[2] Transmission model
Date: Mon 8 Jun 2009
Source: UPI (United Press International) [edited]
<http://www.upi.com/Science_News/2009/06 ... 244483018/>


US scientists have created the 1st model of the avian influenza
viruses that takes into account both direct and indirect transmission
among birds. University of Georgia researchers said their model has
the potential to shed new light on how outbreaks begin in wild bird
populations.

"The environmental transmission of avian influenza among birds is
quite rare, but our model shows that it can play an important role in
outbreaks," Professor Pejman Rohani, the study's lead author, said.
"There are situations where ignoring the possibility of environmental
transmission would cause you to significantly underestimate the
probability, magnitude, and duration of an outbreak."

Rohani said current models of avian influenza only take into account
the direct transmission of the virus that occurs when infected
waterfowl and shorebirds shed the virus in their feces and those
nearby drink contaminated water. But the new study shows some avian
influenza viruses can persist in water for up to 150 days.

So even when no infected birds are present, Rohani said, virus
present in the water can trigger an outbreak. He said models that
only take into account direct transmission would incorrectly conclude
there is no risk of an outbreak when no infected birds are present.

The findings appear in the early online edition of the Proceedings of
the National Academy of Sciences [available at
<http://www.pnas.org/content/early/2009/ ... l.pdf+html>].

--
Communicated by:
ProMED-mail Rapporteur Mary Marshall

[One wonders if external contamination of waterfowl with influenza
viruses can result in these viruses being disseminated to other
wetlands in quantities sufficient to initiate other local outbreaks. - Mod.TY]

Re: Vogelgrippe H5N1 - Behandlung oder Prophylaxe ?

Verfasst: Sa 21. Nov 2009, 18:02
von Birgitt
Vogelgrippe fehlen zwei Mutationen zur Pandemie
Veränderung des Oberflächenproteins Hämagglutinin müssten jedoch gleichzeitig erfolgen

20.11.2009 - scinexx

Warum hat sich die Schweinegrippe zur Pandemie entwickelt, nicht aber die weitaus gefährlichere Vogelgrippe? Diese Frage war lange Zeit offen. Doch jetzt hat ein britisch-amerikanisches Forscherteam in der Fachzeitschrift „PLoS ONE“ geklärt, warum: Um sich ungehindert von Mensch zu Menschen ausbreiten zu können, fehlen den H5N1-Viren noch mindestens zwei genetische Mutationen – die obendrein auch noch gleichzeitig erfolgen müssen ... mehr

Gruß
Birgitt

Re: Vogelgrippe H5N1 - Behandlung oder Prophylaxe ?

Verfasst: Mo 18. Jan 2010, 19:03
von Birgitt
AVIAN INFLUENZA, HUMAN (03): UPDATE
***********************************
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ProMED-mail is a program of the
International Society for Infectious Diseases
<http://www.isid.org>

Date: Fri 15 Jan 2010
Source: Science, ScienceInsider [edited]
<http://blogs.sciencemag.org/scienceinsi ... otten.html>


H5N1 forgotten (almost), but not gone
-------------------------------------
While the world's flu fighters have concentrated on countering the H1N1
swine flu pandemic, avian influenza H5N1 has quietly continued to take its
toll on both poultry and humans. Last year, 17 countries, stretching from
Cote d'Ivoire and Germany to China and Japan, reported outbreaks of H5N1 in
domestic poultry and wild birds; and the World Health Organization, which
still says H5N1 poses a pandemic threat, recorded 72 human cases, 32 of
them fatal [in 2009]. The brunt of the outbreak, entering its 8th year, is
still in China and the developing countries of South East Asia. [In fact in
2009 39 of the 72 confirmed human cases were recorded in Egypt. - Mod.CP]
[In the year 2009] Indonesia alone accounted for 19 of the 32 H5N1 [human]
deaths; Viet Nam, for 5 and China for 4. But there are glimmers of progress.

The number of human deaths has been dropping since peaking at 79 in 2006.
And fewer countries reported outbreaks in 2009 than in 2008 [5 in 2009, 6
in 2008]. Countries are refining responses to outbreaks, as was in evidence
at the Asian Partnership on Emerging Infectious Diseases Researchmeeting in
Kunming, China, from 13 to 16 Jan 2010.

Partnership researchers from Cambodia, China, Indonesia, Laos, Thailand,
and Viet Nam compared notes on the effectiveness of control measures.
Scientists reported that carefully targeted culling can be just as
effective as widespread culling, and less disruptive. Others reported that
reducing risk among those keeping backyard poultry has to be a
community-wide effort, since changing the practices of individual farmers
has proven difficult.

In particular, Witthawat Wiriyarat, a veterinarian and virologist at
Mahidol University in Bangkok told ScienceInsider that a 3 year old
regional surveillance network is making progress in sorting out the role of
wild birds. Some waterfowl initially thought to be spreading the virus,
such as the Asian openbill stork, are now known to quickly succumb to H5N1
infection, Wiriyarat says. But passerine species, or perching birds, are
apparently carrying the virus without ill effects, says Fumin Lei, of the
Chinese Academy of Sciences' Institute of Zoology in Beijing. He adds that
there is a high correlation of outbreaks in poultry and passerine movements.

Wiriyarat says it is still unclear what is sustaining the outbreak, whether
there is a natural reservoir for H5N1, and how the virus is passed between
domestic and wild birds. But while that research continues, the most
effective way to reduce the amount of virus in circulation is to control
outbreaks in poultry, he says.

[byline: Dennis Normile]

--
communicated by:
ProMED-mail rapporteur Mary Marshall

[For a complete record of the H5N1 avian influenza virus outbreak from 2003
up to the present interested readers should consult the WHO table of
confirmed human cases of avian influenza A/(H1N1) as of 30 Dec 2009 at
<http://www.who.int/csr/disease/avian_in ... index.html>
and the WHO timeline at
<http://www.who.int/csr/disease/avian_in ... _01_04.pdf>.

In total, as of 30 Dec 2009 there have been 467 confirmed human cases and
282 deaths. Of the 5 countries reporting H5N1 cases in 2009 mortality was
least in Egypt with 4 deaths among 39 cases and highest in Indonesia with
19 deaths among 20 cases, suggesting that surveillance and treatment
procedures may be improving. - Mod.CP

A timeline of the H5N1 panzootic evolvement since its initial detection in
2003, when Hong Kong reported 2 outbreaks in domestic poultry and 3
outbreaks in wildlife, updatedJan 2010, is available on the OIE website at
<http://www.oie.int/eng/info_ev/en_AI_fa ... meline.htm>; links to
other useful sources are included.

62 countries reported H5N1 avian influenza in domestic poultry/wildlife
2003-2010. During 2009, the disease was officially reported from 17
countries. - Mod.AS]

Re: Vogelgrippe H5N1 - Behandlung oder Prophylaxe ?

Verfasst: Sa 13. Feb 2010, 13:03
von Birgitt
AVIAN INFLUENZA, HUMAN (12): WORLD HEALTH ORGANISATION 2009 UPDATE
*******************************************************************
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ProMED-mail is a program of the
International Society for Infectious Diseases
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Date: Fri 12 Feb 2010
Source: World Health Organisation (WHO), Weekly
epidemiological Record Bulletin, vol. 85, 7 (pp 49-56) [edited]
<http://www.who.int/wer/2010/wer8507.pdf>


Update on human cases of highly pathogenic avian
influenza A (H5N1) infection in 2009

-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
During 2009, 73 laboratory-confirmed cases of
human infection with highly pathogenic avian
influenza A (H5N1) virus were reported to the WHO
from 5 countries. This report summarizes these cases.

Temporal and geographical distribution:
---------------------------------------
The 73 laboratory-confirmed cases of H5N1 virus
infection were reported from Cambodia (1 case),
China (7), Egypt (39), Indonesia (21) and Viet
Nam (5); all of these countries had reported
human cases of H5N1 previously. Circulation of
highly pathogenic H5N1 virus in poultry is
considered to be endemic in these countries, with
the exception of Cambodia, where poultry
outbreaks occur sporadically. As in previous
years, an increase in cases was reported during
the northern hemisphere's winter and spring
seasons [These data are illustrated graphically
in the original text]. Reports of outbreaks among
animals also tended to increase during the same period.

Distribution by sex and age:
----------------------------
In 2009, the overall ratio of male cases (n=35)
to female cases (n=38 ) was almost even (ratio of
males to females, 0.92). However, Indonesia
reported twice as many cases in females as in
males (ratio, 0.5). Cases ranged in age from 6
months to 57 years, with a median age of 5 years.
The low median age was due primarily to the high
proportion of cases occurring among children in
Egypt; Egypt accounted for 53 percent of all
cases worldwide. The age of cases in Egypt was
notably younger than elsewhere, with a median age
of 3 years; 80 percent of cases occurred in children aged less than 10 years.

Outcome:
--------
The overall case-fatality ratio (CFR) for 2009
was 44 percent, lower than the previous 2 years
but similar to the CFR in 2005 [These data are
tabulated in the original text]. CFRs varied
widely among countries. Egypt reported its lowest
CFR (10 percent) since 2003. In all countries,
the CFR was lower for cases aged less thjan 10
years than for cases aged greater than or equal
to 10 years (24 percent versus 71 percent; odds
ratio [OR], 7.8; 95 percent confidence interval
[CI], 2.7­22.4). In contrast to previous years,
the CFR for females in all countries was higher
than for males, but the difference was not
significant (50 percent versus 37 percent; OR,
1.7; 95 percent CI, 0.7­4.3); this pattern was not consistent among countries.

Discussion:
-----------
With almost double the number of human cases of
H5N1 reported in 2009 compared with 2008, and
with continuing circulation of the virus among
certain poultry populations, it is clear that
H5N1 remains a concern for both animal health and
public health. Although the CFR remains high,
there are differences among affected countries.
These data do not allow a determination of the
causes of this difference to be made. Possible
explanations for the disparities among countries
might include differences in the type or
intensity of exposure, in health-seeking
behaviour, in testing or treatment practices, or
even in the virulence of virus strains. The
marked difference in the age distribution of
cases among countries makes a direct comparison
of risk factors difficult, given the relatively
small total number of cases available for
analysis. At present, this remains an avian virus
that has not demonstrated a facility for
human-to-human transmission, and human infections remain rare and sporadic.

A total of 3 clusters, each involving 2 family
members and without sustained human-to-human
transmission, were documented in 2009. It is
notable that all cases have occurred in countries
with ongoing circulation or reintroduction of
highly pathogenic avian influenza A(H5N1) viruses
in poultry. Globally, better management of
outbreaks in poultry in many countries has led to
a decrease in virus circulation and a decreased
risk of human exposure. However, human exposure
and cases can continue to be expected whenever the virus is circulating.

Efforts should be intensified to decrease both
circulation in poultry and the risk of human
exposure. Influenza viruses mutate constantly,
and vigilance must be maintained. Surveillance of
influenza in humans and animals should be
strengthened to enable timely detection of
epidemiological, clinical and virological
changes. The rapid sharing of information
globally is essential to ensure a quick and
comprehensive assessment and global response.

--
Communicated by:
ProMED-mail
<promed@promedmail.org>

[This statement provides a useful review of the
current situation. So far in 2010 there have been
7 additional cases, all in Egypt and unrelated.
The essential message is that at present, highly
pathogenic avian influenza A (H5N1) virus remains
an avian virus that has not demonstrated a
facility for human-to-human transmission, and
human infections remain rare and sporadic.
Efforts should be intensified to decrease both
circulation of this virus in poultry to reduce
the risk of human exposure. - Mod.CP]

Vogelgrippe - Behandlung oder Prophylaxe?

Verfasst: Do 18. Aug 2011, 18:51
von Birgitt
AVIAN INFLUENZA, HUMAN (55): DATA ANALYSIS
******************************************
A ProMED-mail post
<http://www.promedmail.org>
ProMED-mail is a program of the
International Society for Infectious Diseases
<http://www.isid.org>

Date: Thu 11 Aug 22011
Source: Eurosurveillance 2011; 16(32), 11 Aug [edited]
<http://www.eurosurveillance.org/ViewArt ... leId=19941>


Avian influenza A(H5N1) in humans: new insights from a line list of
WHO confirmed cases, Sep 2006 to Aug 2010

---------------------------
Research article by Fiebig L, Soyka J, Buda S, Buchholz U, Dehnert M,
Haas W. in Euro Surveill. 2011;16(32):pii=19941.

Summary
-------
The threat of avian influenza (AI) viruses to humans in Europe in 2005
prompted the Robert Koch Institute to establish a routine monitoring
instrument condensing information on all human AI cases worldwide
reported from the World Health Organization (WHO) and other sources
into a line list for further analysis. The 235 confirmed AI cases
captured from September 2006 to August 2010 had a case fatality rate
of 56 per cent (132/235), ranging from 28 per cent (27/98) in Egypt to
87 per cent (71/82) in Indonesia. In a multivariable analysis, odds of
dying increased by 33 per cent with each day that passed from symptom
onset until hospitalisation (OR: 1.33, p=0.002). In relation to
children of 0-9 years, odds of fatal outcome were more than 6 times
higher in 10-19 year-olds and 20-29 year-olds (OR: 6.06, 95 per cent
CI: 1.89-19.48, p=0.002 and OR: 6.16, 95 per cent CI: 2.05-18.53,
p=0.001, respectively), and nearly 5 times higher in patients of 30
years and older (OR: 4.71, 95 per cent CI: 1.56-14.27, p=0.006)
irrespective of the country which had notified WHO of the cases. The
situation in Egypt was special in that case number and incidence in
children were more than twice as high as in any other age group or
country. With this study, we show that data from the public domain
yield important epidemiological information on the global AI
situation. This approach to establish a line list is time-consuming,
but a line list is a prerequisite to such evaluations. We thus would
like to encourage the placing of a publicly accessible line list of
anonymised human AI cases -- for example, directly by WHO. This might
enhance our understanding of AI in humans and permit the rapid
detection of changes in its epidemiology with implications for human
health.

Introduction
------------
Avian influenza (AI) has received public attention since 1997 when
human infections and thereof 6 fatal cases due to the highly
pathogenic avian influenza A(H5N1) virus strain were confirmed in Hong
Kong [1,2] and the pandemic potential of AI viruses was recognised
[3]. Since 2003, when avian influenza A(H5N1) reappeared, the World
Health Organization (WHO) has reported 526 human infections with avian
influenza A(H5N1), of which 311 were fatal, from Central Asian,
European and African countries [4]. In several areas, highly
pathogenic AI in poultry has become endemic, with implications on
human health, as exposure to sick or dead poultry is a risk factor for
AI in humans [2,5-8]. Because of the pandemic potential of avian
influenza A(H5N1), there is a great need for joint risk assessments
and as a prerequisite for rapid international sharing of biological
materials, reference reagents, epidemiologic data and other
information when available -- for example, between WHO member states
and WHO [9].

Unique efforts were made to share information on AI infections in
humans, domestic poultry and wild birds [10,11] -- for exampl, through
the reporting of confirmed human cases under the International Health
Regulations (2005), supported by the WHO Global Alert and Response
System (GAR) [12]. Case-based reports irrespective of the confirmation
status have been mainly circulated by the Program for Monitoring
Emerging Diseases of the International Society for Infectious Diseases
(ProMED-mail) [13]. News agencies such as Reuters Alertnet [14], and
public health authorities, including the European Centre for Disease
Prevention and Control (ECDC) [15], the World Organisation for Animal
Health (OIE)/Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) network on animal
influenza (OFFLU) [16], and the Global Initiative on Sharing Avian
Influenza Data (GISAID) [17], have contributed in compiling and
publishing updates on AI in humans and birds online. However, a
uniform, case-based and thus statistically analysable epidemiological
database of all human AI cases is not yet publicly available.

Germany, in need for timely information on the AI situation when
Europe faced 1st avian influenza A(H5N1) cases in birds in 2005,
established an AI monitoring system at the Robert Koch Institute (RKI)
in October 2005, which captures case-based information on AI
infections in humans, as well as animal cases with zoonotic potential,
worldwide. This system proved particularly useful for situation
updates, risk assessments and national risk communication from
February 2006 onwards, when avian influenza A(H5N1) was detected in
wild birds in Germany [18]. Although the body of literature has
continuously increased meanwhile, namely through WHO situation updates
[2,19-23], and virological or epidemiological studies [5,24-27], the
RKI AI monitoring system has been maintained to have a flexible
database available for epidemiological evaluations.

With the aim to examine whether a systematic line list based on
publicly available information on human AI cases would contribute to
the understanding of the epidemiology of human AI, we assessed case
characteristics, case fatality, and potential risk factors based on
our established line list.

Methods
-------
Monitoring system: The system established in October 2005, consists of
a database, collecting events and reports in chronological order, and
a line list of human cases. The present analysis is based exclusively
on the line list and covers information on human AI cases reported
between September 2006 and August 2010 and with a symptom onset date
not earlier than September 2006. The monitoring followed a
standardised operating procedure, defining information sources,
intervals for screening the data and for the database management (as
described below), and was maintained in Excel (version 11, Microsoft
Corporation, Redmond, Washington, USA).

Information sources: All screened information sources for human AI
cases were publicly accessible. They included WHO [12], ECDC [15],
ProMED [13], as well as Reuters Alertnet [14]. This range of sources
was accessed to anticipate the extent of non-confirmed human AI and to
assess the loss of information when ignoring them. All sources were
screened on a daily basis (weekdays only). If an event was reported
simultaneously by more than one source, and if there was conflicting
information, WHO reports were ranked highest, followed by ECDC and
ProMED. If an event was reported prior to a WHO report by another
source, both the WHO and the initial report were recorded.

Line list: The line list covered demographic case information, namely
the country to which the cases were assigned to in the initial
reports, the patients' age (in years) and sex, date of symptom onset,
date of hospitalisation, disease outcome, date of death, exposure to
potentially infected poultry, as well as possible contact with
infected individuals. Time intervals from symptom onset to
hospitalisation, from hospital admission to outcome, the duration of
hospitalisation, and the duration of illness were captured in days.
The line list and a description of the variable set are provided
online (<http://www.rki.de/avian-influenza-linelist>).

Case definitions: Cases were classified into 3 groups: confirmed
cases, non-confirmed probable, and suspected cases, in a more
simplified way than by WHO. Confirmed cases comprised avian influenza
A(H5N1) human cases reported by WHO and with WHO confirmation, i.e.
persons with defined clinical signs, epidemiological links and
laboratory confirmation by an influenza laboratory accepted by WHO, as
specified in the WHO case definition [28].

Other reported cases were (irrespective of their clinical
presentation) considered as probable if they had exposure to WHO
confirmed human cases, or to sick or dead poultry, or the AI virus
infection was confirmed by the country or local institutions but not
meeting WHO criteria. All other non-confirmed cases were defined as
suspected cases.

Data analyses: The line list records were compared to the cumulative
number of confirmed human cases of avian influenza A(H5N1) published
by WHO [12]. The delay (in days) between the date of WHO reporting,
and the date of the 1st report by another source than WHO, was
calculated for WHO confirmed cases.

Confirmed cases were further analysed for demographic and
epidemiological characteristics stratified by countries, including
China, Egypt, Indonesia and Vietnam (with 10 or more cases) and a
remaining group of all other countries. The cases were classified in
age groups of 10 year intervals. Incidences were calculated over the
study period as cases per 10 million population, using population data
from the United Nations [29]. Median and inter-quartile ranges (IQRs)
were calculated for continuous variables and absolute numbers and
proportions (together with 95 percent exact confidence intervals
(CIs)) for categorical variables. For comparison of characteristics,
the Kruskal-Wallis test, the Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney test and Fisher's
Exact test were used. Case fatality was assessed by calculating the
cumulative (cCFR) and a rolling case fatality rate (rCFR).
Investigated factors potentially associated with case fatality were
age (grouped as 0-9, 10-19, 20-29, 30 years or older), sex, country,
time from symptom onset to hospitalisation, and reported exposure to
poultry. Univariable and multivariable logistic regression had been
performed and results were presented as odds ratios (OR) with 95
percent confidence intervals. In multivariable analysis forward and
backward selection was applied on all variables, where sex was taken
into account in all calculations. All possible 2-way interaction terms
were tested separately and the likelihood ratio test was used to
analyse whether interaction terms improved the model at a significance
level of 10 percent. The reported p values are 2-sided and p less than
0.05 was considered statistically significant. Data were analysed
using Excel (version 11, Microsoft Corporation, Redmond, Washington,
USA) and Stata (version 11.0, StataCorp LP, TX, USA) software.

Results
-------
[This section has been abbreviated and interested readers should
access the original text via the source URL to view the full text, the
tables and figures, and the literature references cited throughout the
whole document. - Mod.CP]

Reported cases: In the study period, we captured 294 human AI cases in
12 different countries of which 235 (80 percent) were WHO confirmed,
35 (12 per cent) were classified as probable, and 24 (8 per cent) as
suspected. The proportion of confirmed cases was highest in Egypt
(98/99, 99 per cent) and lowest in Indonesia (82/126, 65 per cent).
Numbers of reported WHO confirmed cases in our line list were largely
congruent with cumulative case numbers published by WHO, except for
Indonesia with 82 versus 102 cases, respectively. This allowed for a
close reproduction of WHO graphs on avian influenza A(H5N1) human
cases by date of symptom onset and country, which reveal highest case
numbers in the winter and spring season of the northern hemisphere.

The median delay from symptom onset to the initial report by any
source was 11 days among 201 cases with available information. Egypt
had the shortest median delay of 7 days. 52 per cent of the confirmed
cases (123/235) were initially reported by another source than WHO in
a median of 3 days prior to the WHO report. The shortest median delay
between the initial report and the WHO report was 2 days in China and
Indonesia, whereas the longest median delay was 9 days in Viet Nam and
the grouped remaining countries.

Demographic characteristics: 57 per cent of confirmed cases (132/233
with available information) were women and 43 per cent (101/233) men
corresponding to a men-to-women ratio of 0.8. This ratio ranged from
0.6 to 1.3, with 0.6 in Indonesia, 0.8 in Egypt, 1.0 in the grouped
remaining countries, 1.1 in Viet Nam, and 1.3 in China.

The cases' median age was 18 years but was significantly higher in
women than in men (21 years in women vs. 14 years in men, p=0.04. The
median age differed markedly across countries. The lowest median age
of 6 years was found in Egypt with significant difference between
women and men (16.5 vs 4 years, respectively, p=0.002). In Egypt, the
youngest age group (0 to 9 years) accounted for the highest number of
cases with 53 of 98 cases (54 per cent) and had the highest incidence
of 284 cases per 10 million population of the same age group, over the
4-year study period. In contrast, Indonesia, China, and Viet Nam had
highest case numbers and incidences in the age group of 20 to 29
years.

Exposure to poultry: 96 per cent of confirmed cases (187/194 with
available information) had reportedly direct or indirect contact to
potentially infected poultry. The proportion of individuals with
reported exposure differed significantly across countries (p=0.009)
and ranged from 80 per cent to 100 per cent, with 8/10 in the grouped
remaining countries, 10/12 in China, 55/57 in Indonesia, 93/94 in
Egypt and 21/21 in Viet Nam without significant differences by the
cases' sex or age (p=0.70 and p=0.06, respectively).

Hospitalisation: All 228 cases with available information had been
hospitalised. Patients were admitted to hospital in a median of 4 days
after symptom onset. The median time from symptom onset to
hospitalisation ranged from 2-5 days, with 2 days in Egypt, 2.5 days
in the grouped remaining countries, 4 days in China and 5 days in
Indonesia and Viet Nam. No significant sex-specific differences were
found in this delay (p=0.706).

Case fatality: 56 per cent (132/235) of confirmed cases died. The CFR
differed across countries ranging from 28 per cent (27/98) in Egypt to
87 per cent (71/82) in Indonesia. The cCFR and the 19-month rCFR
indicated a decline in case fatality over the study period. Whereas
the cCFR was little affected by the outcome of new cases and had only
slightly decreased, the rCFR had steeply declined in the period from
April 2008 to April 2009. Until mid 2008, a large proportion of cases
occurred in Indonesia (country with highest CFR) and shifted
thereafter to Egypt (country with lowest CFR). Accordingly,
country-specific rCFRs for Indonesia and Egypt were less steep than
the overall rCFR. The 19-months rCFR was privileged as it was less
affected by case-free periods than rCFRs calculated over shorter
periods (not shown).

In Egypt, fatal cases had a median age of 25 years, which was, at
significant level, higher than the age of cases who survived (4 years,
p less than 0.001; Table 2). The CFR in Egypt was significantly higher
in women than in men, (39 per cent (22/56) vs 12 per cent (5/42)
respectively, p=0.003), which was not observed elsewhere (China: 63
per cent (5/8) in women vs 70 per cent (7/10) in men, p=1.0;
Indonesia: 84 per cent (43/51) vs 90 per cent (28/31), p=0.521; Viet
Nam: 58 per cent (7/12) vs 69 per cent (9/13), p=0.688; remaining
countries: 80 per cent (4/5) vs 40 per cent (2/5), p=0.524,
respectively).

A significant difference in time from symptom onset to hospitalisation
between survivors and fatal cases was only found in Egypt (one day vs
4.5 days respectively, p=0.001). All 19 cases worldwide hospitalised 8
days after symptom onset or later had died.

Discussion and conclusions
--------------------------
[The section also has been abbreviated and only conclusions are
presented here. Readers should consult the original document for the
full analysis. - Mod.CP]

With this study, we summarised the current global AI situation in
humans. It is, to our knowledge, the 1st study that not only analysed
human AI cases worldwide on the basis of a line list collected over
several years but in addition made these case-based data available
online. We found that a longer delay from symptom onset to hospital
admission and belonging to older age groups were associated with
higher mortality in AI patients, and that the situation in Egypt
differed markedly from other countries with highest AI incidences in
children and lowest CFR.

Confirmed cases had a median age of 18 years, which is consistent with
earlier findings, although investigation periods and affected
countries varied [2,19,21]. The identified predominance of female
cases in Indonesia and Egypt and the low age median among Egyptian
cases support findings from previous studies [2,23-25]. 96 percent of
the cases had reportedly direct or indirect contact to potentially
infected poultry, recognised as the most important risk factor for
humans AI [8,34].

The median time from symptom onset to hospitalisation was 4 days,
which is remarkably stable when compared to earlier studies [19,21].
If time to hospital admission is regarded as an indicator for
monitoring case management and patients' awareness [31], no progress
would be evident from a global perspective so far.

The cases' average CFR was 56 per cent, which is widely consistent
with findings from earlier investigation periods [2,19,23]. Using a
19-month rolling CFR, we found a clear decrease in case fatality,
which persisted when stratifying for Egypt and Indonesia. It could
thus not simply be explained by a predominance of Egyptian cases since
2009. Regarding the decreasing CFR in Egypt, Schroedl [32] suggested
that the circulating AI virus strain may have become less virulent and
more apt to spreading among children.

Analytical results revealed lowest odds of dying for Egyptian cases,
even when adjusted for age, sex and time to hospitalisation. Thus, the
high proportion of survivors in Egypt cannot be entirely explained --
as often assumed -- by sex-specific differences in CFR [21,24] and the
high proportion of children among AI patients in Egypt [5], as well as
short delays from symptom onset to hospitalisation [25].

It cannot be ruled out, that different virus clades circulating in
Egypt (clade 2.2) and Asia (clades 2.1 and 2.3) shape the
country-specific epidemiological features [2,23]. Differences in CFR
across countries and changes over time might also partly be explained
by differences in intensity and quality of exposure, health-seeking
behaviour, reporting attitudes, overall performance of the
surveillance system, and access to diagnostics and medical care
[23,27,39,40], such as the time to start of oseltamivir treatment, the
antiviral recommend by WHO for human infections with AI virus [2].
However, country-specific details on its administration are widely
unknown, and it remains controversial up to how many days after
symptom onset the application of the antiviral reduces mortality
[30,41]. In our study, all patients hospitalised 8 or more days after
symptom onset died. This suggests a rather narrow time window for
antiviral drug administration.

Our study points out that data extracted from the public domain
already yields pertinent epidemiological information for assessing the
current situation and developments of AI in humans. A line list format
as provided would enhance the analysability of key data, their
updating, and the evaluation of variables needed. Several countries
monitor the global AI situation, whether they currently face human AI
cases, e.g. Egypt [25], or not, e.g. France [27]. This indicates a
common interest in data and if they were directly provided in such
format, this would help to save time and resources for public health
authorities and researchers.

A line list needs to be flexible in view of potential new information
to be entered. New variables and parameter values might come up, when
the minimum dataset suggested Bird and Farrar [31] on direct and
indirect exposures to avian influenza A(H5N1) confirmed and
non-confirmed poultry and human exposures would be implemented or when
results from prospective studies involving exposed and unexposed
individuals as designed by Kayali et al. [34] are available.
Unconfirmed cases would ideally be recorded as systematically as
confirmed cases, either in a common or separate database as suggested
by Bird and Farrar [31].

Presenting cases in the format of a line list is not a goal in itself,
but a prerequisite for targeting surveillance and identifying risk
factors, as well as a starting point for prospective studies, e.g.
investigating potential human-to-human transmission, the
transmissibility of avian influenza viruses, and host-related factors
including age-dependent immunity in humans [33,42].

We would like to encourage that an anonymised case-based database for
AI in humans is directly placed publicly and continuously updated,
e.g. by an internationally renowned organisation such as WHO. Open
access to analysable data might accelerate the identification and
implementation of research questions and surveillance priorities and
thus enhance our understanding of -- still mostly fatal -- AI in
humans and permit the rapid detection of epidemiological changes with
implications for human health.

--
communicated by:
ProMED-mail
<promed@promedmail.org>

[The editors of ProMED-mail are encouraged to learn that our database
has played a useful role in this analysis. - Mod.CP]

Vogelgrippe - Alert

Verfasst: Di 30. Aug 2011, 23:25
von Birgitt
AVIAN INFLUENZA, HUMAN (57): ALERT
**********************************
A ProMED-mail post
<http://www.promedmail.org>
ProMED-mail is a program of the
International Society for Infectious Diseases
<http://www.isid.org>

Date: Mon 29 Aug 2011
Source: Food and Agriculture Organisation of The United Nations (FAO)
News Centre [edited]
<http://www.fao.org/news/story/en/item/87196/icode/>


The FAO today [29 Aug 2011] urged heightened readiness and
surveillance against a possible major resurgence of the H5N1 highly
pathogenic avian influenza amid signs that a mutant strain of the
deadly bird flu virus is spreading in Asia and beyond, with
unpredictable risks to human health.

The H5N1 virus has infected 565 people since it 1st appeared in 2003,
killing 331 of them, according to WHO figures [summarised in:
<http://www.who.int/csr/disease/avian_in ... _08_19/en/>].
The latest death occurred earlier this month [August 2011] in
Cambodia, which has registered 8 cases of human infection this year
[2011] -- all of them fatal (see: ProMED-mail report archived as:
Avian influenza, human (56): Cambodia (KC) 20110819.2525).

Since 2003, H5N1 has killed or forced the culling of more than 400
million domestic poultry and caused an estimated USD 20 billion of
economic damage across the globe before it was eliminated from most of
the 63 countries infected at its peak in 2006.

However, the virus remained endemic in 6 nations, although the number
of outbreaks in domestic poultry and wild bird populations shrank
steadily from an annual peak of 4000 to just 302 in mid 2008. But
outbreaks have risen progressively since [then], with almost 800 cases
recorded in 2010-2011.

At the same time, 2008 marked the beginning of renewed geographic
expansion of the H5N1 virus both in poultry and wild birds. The
advance appears to be associated with migratory bird movements,
according to FAO chief veterinary officer Juan Lubroth. He said
migrations help the virus travel over long distances, so that H5N1
has, in the past 24 months, shown up in poultry or wild birds in
countries that had been virus-free for several years. "Wild birds may
introduce the virus, but peoples' actions in poultry production and
marketing spread it," Lubroth noted.

Recently affected areas are to be found in Israel and the Palestinian
Territories, Bulgaria, Romania, Nepal, and Mongolia.

A further cause for concern, Lubroth said, is the appearance in China
and Viet Nam of a variant virus apparently able to sidestep the
defenses provided by existing [veterinary] vaccines. In Viet Nam,
which suspended its springtime poultry vaccination campaign this year
[2011], most of the northern and central parts of the country -- where
H5N1 is endemic -- have been invaded by the new virus strain, known as
H5N1 - 2.3.2.1.

Viet Nam's veterinary services are on high alert and reportedly are
considering a novel, targeted vaccination campaign this fall [2011].
Virus circulation in Viet Nam poses a direct threat to Cambodia,
Thailand, and Malaysia as well as endangering the Korean peninsula and
Japan further afield. Wild bird migration can also spread the virus to
other continents.

"The general departure from the progressive decline observed in
2004-2008 could mean that there will be a flare up of H5N1 this fall
and winter [2011-12], with people unexpectedly finding the virus in
their backyard," Lubroth said. The countries where H5N1 is still
firmly entrenched -- Bangladesh, China, Egypt, India, Indonesia, and
Viet Nam -- are likely to face the biggest problems, but no country
can consider itself safe, he said. "Preparedness and surveillance
remain essential," Lubroth underlined. "This is no time for
complacency. No one can let their guard down with H5N1."

--
communicated by:
ProMED-mail rapporteur Mary Marshall

[According to WHO, the primary risk factor for human infection appears
to be direct or indirect exposure to infected live or dead poultry or
contaminated environments. Controlling circulation of the H5N1 virus
in poultry is essential to reducing the risk of human infection. Given
the persistence of the H5N1 virus in some poultry populations, control
will require long term commitments from countries and strong
coordination between animal and public health authorities.

There is no evidence to suggest that the H5N1 virus can be transmitted
to humans through properly prepared poultry or eggs. A few human cases
have been linked to consumption of dishes made of raw, contaminated
poultry blood. However, slaughter, defeathering, handling carcasses of
infected poultry, and preparing poultry for consumption, especially in
household settings, are likely to be risk factors.

Influenza pandemics (outbreaks that affect a large proportion of the
world) are unpredictable but recurring events that can have health,
economic, and social consequences worldwide. An influenza pandemic
occurs when key factors converge: an influenza virus emerges with the
ability to cause sustained transmission from human-to-human, and there
is very low, or no, immunity to the virus among most people. In the
interconnected world of today, a localized epidemic can transform into
a pandemic rapidly, with little time to prepare a public health
response to halt the spread of illness.

The H5N1 AI virus remains one of the influenza viruses with pandemic
potential, because it continues to circulate widely in some poultry
populations, most humans likely have no immunity to it, and it can
cause severe disease and death in humans. In addition to H5N1, other
animal influenza virus subtypes reported to have infected people
include avian H7 and H9, and swine H1 and H3 viruses. H2 viruses may
also pose a pandemic threat. Therefore, pandemic planning should
consider risks of emergence of a variety of influenza subtypes from a
variety of sources (see:
<http://www.who.int/mediacentre/factshee ... index.html>).

Avian influenza A/(H5N1) virus has been continuously evolving as
indicated by the clade designation 2.3.2.1. FAO has been prudent to
draw attention to the resurgence of avian influenza in poultry and the
prevalence of a novel strain apparently not susceptible to control by
currently deployed veterinary vaccines. However, there is no evidence
as yet to indicate that this new strain is more transmissible to and
between humans. The high lethality of avian H5N1 influenza virus for
humans in Cambodia is not a new or general phenomenon. - Mod.CP]

Vogelgrippe - Übertragung des Virus

Verfasst: Mo 26. Sep 2011, 22:57
von Birgitt
AVIAN INFLUENZA, HUMAN (59): TRANSMISSION IN MAMMALS
****************************************************
A ProMED-mail post
<http://www.promedmail.org>
ProMED-mail is a program of the
International Society for Infectious Diseases
<http://www.isid.org>

Date: Mon 26 Sep 2011
Source: New Scientist, issue 2831 [edited]
<http://www.newscientist.com/article/mg2 ... ations-to->


H5N1 bird flu [avian A/H5N1 influenza virus] can kill humans but has
not gone pandemic because it cannot spread easilyamong us. That might
change: 5 mutations in just 2 genes have allowed the virus to spread
between mammals [ferrets] in the lab. What's more, the virus is just
as lethal [to ferrets] despite the mutations.

"The virus is transmitted as efficiently as seasonal flu," says Ron
Fouchier of the Erasmus Medical Centre in Rotterdam, the Netherlands,
who reported the work at a scientific meeting on flu last week in
Malta. "This shows clearly that [the H5N1 virus] can change in a way
that allows transmission and still cause severe disease in humans.
It's scary," says Peter Doherty, a 1996 Nobel prizewinner for work in
viral immunology.

H5N1 evolved in poultry in east Asia and has spread across Eurasia
since 2004. In that time, 565 people are known to have caught it; 331
died. No strain [of the avian H5N1 virus] that spreads readily among
mammals has emerged in that time, despite millions of infected birds
and infections in people, cats and pigs. Efforts to create such a
virus in the lab have failed, and some virologists think H5N1 simply
cannot do it.

The work by Fouchier's team suggests otherwise. They 1st gave H5N1 3
mutations known to adapt bird flu to mammals. This version of the
virus killed ferrets, which react to flu viruses in a similar way to
humans. The virus did not transmit between them, though.

Then the researchers gave the virus from the sick ferrets to more
ferrets, a standard technique for making pathogens adapt to an animal.
They repeated this 10 times, using stringent containment. The 10th
round of ferrets shed an H5N1 strain that spread to ferrets in
separate cages and killed them. The process yielded viruses with many
new mutations, but 2 were in all of them. Those plus the 3 added
deliberately "suggest that as few as 5 are required to make the virus
airborne," says Fouchier. He will now test H5N1 made with only those
5.

All the mutations have been seen separately in H5N1 from birds. "If
they occur separately, they can occur together," says Fouchier. Malik
Peiris of the University of Hong Kong, a flu virologist, says this
means H5N1 transmissible between humans can evolve in birds, where it
is circulating already, without needing to spend time in mammals such
as pigs.

Peter Palese, a flu specialist at Mount Sinai Medical Center in New
York City who has expressed doubts that H5N1 can adapt to mammals, is
not convinced. "Ferrets are not humans," he says. "H5N1 has been
around for a long time" and failed to mutate into a form that can jump
between people.

"That it has not adapted doesn't mean it cannot," replies Jeffery
Taubenberger of the US National Institutes of Health in Bethesda,
Maryland, who studies how a bird flu became the deadly pandemic of
1918. "It simply means that so far, it has not, luckily for us."

[Byline: Debora MacKenzie]

--
Communicated by:
ProMED-mail Rapporteur Mary Marshall

[Unfortunately, this account provides too little detail to assess the
validity of these claims, and proper evaluation of these experiments
must await publication of the data.

It seems certain that only a few mutations are required to produce a
virus that will be transmissible between humans. However, for such an
outcome to occur in nature, there needs to be an appropriate selection
pressure. From the information provided in this account, it is not
possible to infer what this might be precisely. Publication of the
data is awaited with much interest. - Mod.CP]

Vogelgrippe H5N1 - Impfung und Virus-Evolution

Verfasst: Fr 21. Okt 2011, 20:01
von Birgitt
AVIAN INFLUENZA (64): VACCINATION AND H5N1 VIRUS EVOLUTION
**********************************************************

A ProMED-mail post
http://www.promedmail.org
ProMED-mail is a program of the
International Society for Infectious Diseases
http://www.isid.org


[1]
Date: Fri 14 Oct 2011
Source: CIDRAP News [edited]
http://www.cidrap.umn.edu/cidrap/conten ... -jrw2.html


Highly pathogenic H5N1 avian flu viruses in countries that
mass-vaccinate poultry appear to evolve more rapidly than viruses in
countries that do not, a study in Vaccine revealed. An international
research team analyzed 751 H5N1 sequences from Egypt, Indonesia,
Nigeria, Turkey, and Thailand, noting that the 1st 2 nations practice
mass vaccination, while the other 3 do not. The team wrote: "Although
the direct association between H5N1 vaccination and virus evolution is
difficult to establish, we found evidence for a difference in the
evolutionary dynamics of H5N1 viruses among countries where
vaccination was or was not adopted." The mean rates of evolution among
viruses, in thousandths of a nucleotide substitution per site per
year, were: Egypt, 5.36; Indonesia, 6.13; Nigeria, 5.20; Turkey, 4.04;
and Thailand, 2.52. In Egypt, the subclade most widely circulating in
poultry, subclade B, had a rate of 8.87. As a measure of selection
pressure, the investigators also assessed the number of positively
selected sites in the hemagglutinin gene of viruses from the various
countries: Egypt, 9; Indonesia, 6; Nigeria, 2; Turkey, 0; and
Thailand, 3. The authors emphasize that vaccination, when properly
planned and adopted, is a powerful tool against H5N1. But they
conclude that, if it is not properly implemented, "vaccination may
contribute to the rapid evolution and antigenic change of H5N1
viruses, creating opportunities for the viruses to escape from vaccine
protection."

--
Communicated by:
ProMED-mail

******
[2]
Date: Sat 15 Oct 2011 [accessed]
Source: Vaccine (2011), article in press, abstract [edited]
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/ar ... 0X11015842


Ref: Cattoli G, et al. Evidence for differing evolutionary dynamics of
A/H5N1 viruses among countries applying or not applying avian
influenza vaccination in poultry. Vaccine (2011),
doi:10.1016/j.vaccine.2011.09.127. [Accepted for publication 30 Sep
2011; Available online 12 Oct 2011]
-------------------
Abstract

Highly pathogenic avian influenza (HPAI) H5N1 (clade 2.2) was
introduced into Egypt in early 2006. Despite the control measures
taken, including mass vaccination of poultry, the virus rapidly spread
among commercial and backyard flocks. Since the initial outbreaks, the
virus in Egypt has evolved into a 3rd order clade (clade 2.2.1) and
diverged into antigenically and genetically distinct subclades. To
better understand the dynamics of HPAI H5N1 evolution in countries
that differ in vaccination policy, we undertook an in-depth analysis
of those virus strains circulating in Egypt between 2006 and 2010 and
compared countries where vaccination was adopted (Egypt and Indonesia)
to those where it was not (Nigeria, Turkey and Thailand). This study
incorporated 751 sequences (Egypt n = 309, Indonesia n = 149, Nigeria
n = 106, Turkey n = 87, Thailand n = 100) of the complete
haemagglutinin (HA) open reading frame, the major antigenic
determinant of influenza A virus. Our analysis revealed that 2 main
Egyptian subclades (termed A and B) have co-circulated in domestic
poultry since late 2007 and exhibit different profiles of positively
selected codons and rates of nucleotide substitution. The mean
evolutionary rate of subclade A H5N1 viruses was 4.07 x 10 -3
nucleotide substitutions per site, per year (HPD 95 percent,
3.23-4.91), whereas subclade B possessed a markedly higher
substitution rate (8.87 x 10 -3; 95 percent HPD 7.0-10.72 x 10 -3) and
a stronger signature of positive selection. Although the direct
association between H5N1 vaccination and virus evolution is difficult
to establish, we found evidence for a difference in the evolutionary
dynamics of H5N1 viruses among countries where vaccination was or was
not adopted. In particular, both evolutionary rates and the number of
positively selected sites were higher in virus populations circulating
in countries applying avian influenza vaccination for H5N1, compared
to viruses circulating in countries which had never used vaccination.
We, therefore, urge a greater consideration of the potential
consequences of inadequate vaccination on viral evolution.

--
Communicated by:
ProMED-mail

[Highly pathogenic avian influenza H5N1 has become endemic in 6
countries: Bangladesh, India, the People's Republic of China, Egypt,
Indonesia and Viet Nam, of which the 4 latter ones practice a
vaccination policy. The analysis described in the above paper
addressed 2 of these countries, Egypt and Indonesia, comparing them to
3 countries where the disease is not endemic and vaccination is not
applied (Nigeria, Turkey and Thailand).

The following concluding remarks from the discussion chapter are of
interest:

"The direct association between H5N1 vaccination and virus evolution
is clearly difficult to establish since other factors, difficult to
evaluate under field conditions, might contribute to the apparent
differences in evolutionary dynamics observed here. For example,
poultry density, a variety of ecological factors or environmental
changes may contribute to the different rates of nucleotide
substitution and strength of natural selection in those viruses
circulating in poultry. In addition, the endemicity of H5N1 viruses,
the number of distinct introductions of H5N1 (e.g. in Nigeria and
Turkey), may also have influenced the pattern of viral evolution. When
properly planned and adopted, vaccination is a powerful tool for the
control and eradication of avian influenza in poultry, as demonstrated
by past experiences in Italy, Viet Nam and Hong Kong, where it reduced
economic losses and the risks for zoonotic transmission. However, if
not properly applied and not coupled with careful surveillance, robust
vaccine strategies and strict bio-security precautions, vaccination
may contribute to the rapid evolution and antigenic change of H5N1
viruses, creating opportunities for the viruses to escape from vaccine
protection. Clearly, more sophisticated and effective animal health
control and prevention measures are urgently required, such as
sustainable and efficacious vaccination strategies for poultry."

The issue has been discussed earlier this year [2011] in FAO Animal
Production and Health paper No 171: "Approaches to controlling,
preventing and eliminating H5N1 HPAI in endemic countries,"
(extensively cited in archived 20110424.1286). It included, inter
alia, the following passage:

"In several countries where vaccination has been used, antigenic
variant viruses have been detected, although it is not yet clear
whether the vaccine was responsible. In the People's Republic of
China, this problem has been addressed by introduction of new vaccine
antigens. In countries such as Egypt and Indonesia, despite access to
the necessary technology, it has proven difficult to make the
necessary changes to vaccines quickly. Systems need to be in place to
detect antigenic variants rapidly through antigenic testing and
experimental challenge of vaccinated poultry with suspected antigenic
variants, and to make adjustments to vaccines."

As recently published by the OIE (20110901.2678), a vaccine against
the novel H5N1 clade 2.3.2.1 virus, reportedly identified in Viet Nam
and China, is already in the testing phase in China.

Does a non-vaccination approach in an endemic situation deserve
consideration? The Bangladeshi experience (519 outbreaks in poultry
since March 2007, as of 6 Sep 2011; a total of 3 human cases, no
mortality) may serve as a useful test-case, deserving a thorough
epidemiological and socio-economical analysis, taking into
consideration both human and animal health aspects as well as
technical and cost-effectiveness issues.

Updated animal-health related epidemiological observations of the
Bangladeshi epizootic are included in a recent paper (Ahmed SSU,
Ersboll AK, Biswas PK, Christensen JP, Toft N (2011) Spatio-Temporal
Magnitude and Direction of Highly Pathogenic Avian Influenza (H5N1)
Outbreaks in Bangladesh. PLoS ONE 6(9): e24324.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0024324. Available on-line
http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/article ... 024324.pdf).
- Mod.AS]

Vogelgrippe H5N1 - Research Moratorium

Verfasst: Mo 23. Jan 2012, 19:45
von Birgitt
AVIAN INFLUENZA, HUMAN (10): RESEARCH MORATORIUM
************************************************
A ProMED-mail post
http://www.promedmail.org
ProMED-mail is a program of the
International Society for Infectious Diseases
http://www.isid.org


[1]

Date: Fri 20 Jan 2012
Source: CIDRAP News [edited]
http://www.cidrap.umn.edu/cidrap/conten ... pause.html


Researchers announce pause in controversial H5N1 studies
-------------------------------------------------
Leading influenza researchers from around the world, faced with a relentless controversy over experiments dealing with potentially dangerous H5N1 viruses, today announced a 60-day pause in such research to allow time to discuss its risks, benefits, and oversight. The letter was signed by 39 researchers, including the authors of two as-yet-unpublished studies that involved the generation of mutant H5N1 viruses that spread readily in ferrets. The statement was published simultaneously today in Science and Nature, the journals to which those studies were submitted [reproduced below as part (2)].

In late December [2011] the US government, following a recommendation from the National Science Advisory Board for Biosecurity (NSABB), recommended that the two journals delete key details from those reports before publishing, out of concern that the findings could be misused. The journals indicated consent, provided a way could be devised to share the details with responsible scientists who need them. Today's statement from the researchers says nothing about postponing publication of the studies, referring only to a break in research activities.

"We recognize that we and the rest of the scientific community need to clearly explain the benefits of this important research and the measures taken to minimize its possible risks," the letter says. "We propose to do so in an international forum in which the scientific community comes together to discuss and debate these issues.

"We realize that organizations and governments around the world need time to find the best solutions for opportunities and challenges that stem from the work. To provide time for these discussions, we have agreed on a voluntary pause of 60 days on any research involving highly pathogenic avian influenza H5N1 viruses leading to the generation of viruses that are more transmissible in mammals.

"In addition, no experiments with live H5N1 or H5 HA [haemagglutinin] reassortant viruses already shown to be transmissible in ferrets will be conducted during this time."

No plans for an international conference on the issues raised by the two H5N1 studies have yet been announced. But the US National Institutes of Health (NIH) said in a statement today that the World Health Organization (WHO) is working to organize a forum in the coming weeks. Also, a news story published today by ScienceInsider, citing unnamed sources, said that WHO is planning the meeting for late February in Geneva.

The researchers' letter seemed designed in part to allay fears about the risk of an accidental release of highly transmissible H5N1 virus. Noting that a "perceived fear" of such an accident has generated "intense public debate", the scientists say, "We would like to assure the public that these experiments have been conducted with appropriate regulatory oversight in secure containment facilities by highly trained and responsible personnel to minimize any risks of accidental release." Previous reports have noted that the two studies were conducted in labs rated at biosecurity level (BSL) 3+, a notch below BSL-4, the highest rating.

The lead signer of the letter is Ron A M Fouchier of Erasmus Medical Centre in the Netherlands, lead author of the H5N1 study that was submitted to Science and the one that has been discussed in greatest detail. The third signer of the letter is Yoshihiro Kawaoka of the University of Wisconsin and the University of Tokyo, lead author of the study submitted to Nature.

The idea of a research pause was promoted by NSABB chair, Dr Paul Keim of Northern Arizona University in Flagstaff, along with Fouchier and Kawaoka, according to the ScienceInsider report. The story said it is modeled in part on a moratorium that recombinant DNA researchers agreed to in 1975, when the public was worried about the safety of their research.

In a ScienceInsider interview published this afternoon, Fouchier said that Dr Adolfo Garcia-Sastre of Mt Sinai Medical Center in New York City was involved with Kawaoka and Fouchier himself in initiating the letter. He acknowledged they were concerned about the possibility of a government move to stop the kind of research reported in the two papers.

In today's NIH statement, the research pause was praised by NIH Director Francis S Collins, MD, PhD, and Anthony Fauci, MD, director of the National Institute of Allergy and Infectious Diseases, which sponsored both of the H5N1 studies in question. "We applause the decision by these scientists, who have demonstrated great responsibility and flexibility in pausing their work to allow for a full dialogue about the risks and benefits of this research," Collins and Fauci said. "NIH, the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention and other US government agencies that conduct or fund such research will also abide by this moratorium." The two officials also commented, "Understanding how influenza viruses become human pandemic threats is vitally important to global health preparedness."

According to a news story published today in Nature, Fauci acknowledged that the announced pause is not long but said researchers were concerned about having an open-ended moratorium. "Sixty days as a start I think is reasonable, and after 60 days we will re-evaluate it," he told the journal. Dr Michael T Osterholm, an NSABB member, praised the moratorium but voiced concern that it will be too short. "This is a very positive step forward, and will be helpful in bringing an opportunity for a very thoughtful and far-reaching discussion about next steps," he said. "But I think it's overambitious to think we can come up with an international plan and implementation strategy in 60 days. We know it needs to be done as quickly as possible, but at the same time it's got to be done right."

(byline: Robert Roos)

******
[2]
Date: Fri 20 Jan 2012
Source: Nature (2012) doi:10.1038/481443a, published online [edited]
http://www.nature.com/nature/journal/va ... 1443a.html


Pause on avian flu transmission studies
---------------------------------------
(formal statement by: Ron A M Fouchier, Adolfo García-Sastre, Yoshihiro Kawaoka, and 36 co-authors)

The continuous threat of an influenza pandemic represents one of the biggest challenges in public health. Influenza pandemics are known to be caused by viruses that evolve from animal reservoirs, such as birds and pigs, and can acquire genetic changes that increase their ability to transmit in humans. Pandemic preparedness plans have been implemented worldwide to mitigate the impact of influenza pandemics. A major obstacle in preventing influenza pandemics is that little is known regarding what makes an influenza virus transmissible in humans. As a consequence, the potential pandemic risk associated with the many different influenza viruses of animals cannot be assessed with any certainty.

Recent research breakthroughs identified specific determinants of transmission of H5N1 influenza viruses in ferrets. Responsible research on influenza virus transmission using different animal models is conducted by multiple laboratories in the world using the highest international standards of biosafety and biosecurity practices that effectively prevent the release of transmissible viruses from the laboratory. These standards are regulated and monitored closely by the relevant authorities. This statement is being made by the principal investigators of these laboratories.

In two independent studies conducted in two leading influenza laboratories at the University of Wisconsin–Madison and Erasmus MC in Rotterdam, the Netherlands, investigators have proved that viruses possessing a haemagglutinin (HA) protein from highly pathogenic avian H5N1 influenza viruses can become transmissible in ferrets. This is critical information that advances our understanding of influenza transmission. However, more research is needed to determine how influenza viruses in nature become human pandemic threats, so that they can be contained before they acquire the ability to transmit from human to human, or so that appropriate countermeasures can be deployed if adaptation to humans occurs.

Despite the positive public-health benefits these studies sought to provide, a perceived fear that the ferret-transmissible H5 HA viruses may escape from the laboratories has generated intense public debate in the media on the benefits and potential harm of this type of research. We would like to assure the public that these experiments have been conducted with appropriate regulatory oversight in secure containment facilities by highly trained and responsible personnel to minimize any risk of accidental release. Whether the ferret-adapted influenza viruses have the ability to transmit from human to human cannot be tested.

We recognize that we and the rest of the scientific community need to clearly explain the benefits of this important research and the measures taken to minimize its possible risks. We propose to do so in an international forum in which the scientific community comes together to discuss and debate these issues. We realize that organizations and governments around the world need time to find the best solutions for opportunities and challenges that stem from the work. To provide time for these discussions, we have agreed on a voluntary pause of 60 days on any research involving highly pathogenic avian influenza H5N1 viruses leading to the generation of viruses that are more transmissible in mammals. In addition, no experiments with live H5N1 or H5 HA reassortant viruses already shown to be transmissible in ferrets will be conducted during this time. We will continue to assess the transmissibility of H5N1 influenza viruses that emerge in nature and pose a continuing threat to human health.

--
communicated by:
ProMED-mail <promed@promedmail.org>

["Watch this space!" - Mod.CP]

Vogelgrippe H5N1 - Research Controversy

Verfasst: Mo 5. Mär 2012, 18:22
von Birgitt
AVIAN INFLUENZA (12): H5N1 RESEARCH CONTROVERSY
***********************************************
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ProMED-mail is a program of the
International Society for Infectious Diseases
http://www.isid.org


Date: Sun 5 Feb 2012
From: Prof. H. Tolou [edited]



I wish to comment on information on the 2 Feb 2012 NYAS symposium on H5N1 dual use research you recently published [Avian influenza (10): H5N1 research controversy 20120204.1032857].

I am disappointed by the debate you report. I think the good questions are not addressed, so there cannot be good answers.

I think the main questions to answer are:

- Has the concerned work on H5N1 mutation demonstrated that H5N1 will evolve the proposed way and that it will undoubtedly appear without human intervention? The answer is no.

- Has the concerned work produced the virus that will certainly appear in nature and constitute a new threat for human beings, so that it deserves and allows new research, looking for vaccine or antivirals? Again, the answer is no. H5N1 could naturally evolve in a way different enough to pose different problems, particularly regarding vaccine design. However, a potentially dangerous virus now exists and it could "leak" from a laboratory. "Mother Nature" is not the "mother of bioterrorism," as some scientists are now used to saying!

- Has the concerned work given the signal to evil-minded people that a terrifying agent could be obtained from H5N1 virus? The answer is yes: Make some efforts, they will probably be successful!

- Has the concerned work sufficient scientific or technical originality or interest (Using particular, non-natural conditions, a pathogenic virus can mutate to a -- potentially -- more pathogenic one: What's new?) to deserve publication in journals we generally regard as prestigious? I am not sure, unless media impact has became the main criteria for good research. As V. Racaniello says, "If you think you can (do a risk-benefit analysis), you are wrong." I totally agree. But it is not a reason to do hazardous research when you know it is essentially hazardous research.

I totally disagree with any encouragement given to that kind of research. My point of view is strictly personal. I hope it will contribute to this important debate.

--
Communicated by
Prof. H. Tolou
Armed Forces Biomedical Research Institute - IRBA
France


[There are a number of different views on this subject, but as the report quoted has not stirred up any other comments from our readers, this thread is now closed. - Mod.JW]